Hi! I am a Ph.D. student in Economics at the University of Bonn.

Research interests: Economic theory, particularly mechanism design without money.

I will be on the 2022/23 job market and available for interviews in December and January.

You can reach me at justus.preusser@uni-bonn.de.

You can find my CV here.

Job market paper

  • Simple allocation with correlated types (with Axel Niemeyer)

    • Abstract An object must be allocated among a number of agents. The efficient allocation depends on the agents' information about their peers, but each agent wants the object for themself. Monetary transfers are unavailable. We consider mechanisms where it is a dominant strategy to report truthfully. On the negative side, deterministic mechanisms do not generally suffice, and anonymous mechanisms cannot elicit any information. On the positive side, there are simple mechanisms-jury mechanisms-that are optimal when there are three or fewer agents, approximately optimal in symmetric environments with many agents, and the only deterministic mechanisms satisfying a relaxed anonymity notion. In a jury mechanism, each agent is either a juror or a candidate. The jurors decide which candidate wins the object; jurors never win.

Working papers

  • Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents (with Deniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer and Alexander Winter)

    • Extended abstract accepted at EC’ 22.

    • Abstract A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application of this setting is the efficient division of a fixed budget between two competing departments. We first characterize all implementable mechanisms under arbitrary correlation. Second, we study when there exists a mechanism that yields the principal a higher payoff than she could receive by choosing the ex-ante optimal decision without consulting the agents. In the budget example, such a profitable mechanism exists if and only if the information of one department is also relevant for the expected returns of the other department. We generalize this insight to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a profitable mechanism in the n-agent allocation problem with independent types.
  • Transparency in sequential common-value trade (with Andre Speit)

    • Abstract We consider the sale of a single indivisible common-value good in a dynamic market where short-lived buyers arrive over time. Buyers observe private signals about the value. The seller is initially uninformed and proposes the terms of trade. As time passes, all players learn about the value from delay in trade. Importantly, this learning process depends on what is made public about buyer-seller interactions. We compare the division of surplus across three transparency regimes that differ with respect to whether buyers observe the seller’s past actions or time-on-the-market. When the seller’s time-on-the-market but not the seller’s past actions are observable, and if buyers’ signals are sufficiently rich, then there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the seller extracts the full surplus. In the other two regimes, where buyers observe either everything or nothing about the seller’s past actions and time-on-the-market, the seller extracts the full surplus in at least one equilibrium, no matter the signal structure.
  • Costly evidence and the value of commitment

    • Abstract A principal has to accept or reject a proposal. The optimal decision depends on the verifiable type of an agent. The agent always wants the proposal to be accepted, and can influence the distribution of the type at a cost. If the principal does not have commitment power, the principal is typically no better off than when acting uninformedly. The principal can be strictly better off by committing to a mechanism. Optimally, the principal commits to sometimes rejecting the proposal when it is optimal to accept, and commit to sometimes accepting the proposal when it is optimal to reject.