Hi! I am a Ph.D. student in Economics at the University of Bonn.

Research interests: Economic theory, particularly mechanism design without money.

I will be on the 2022/23 job market and available for interviews in December and January.

You can reach me at justus.preusser@uni-bonn.de.

You can find my CV here.

## Job market paper

• Abstract An object must be allocated among a number of agents. The efficient allocation depends on the agents' information about their peers, but each agent wants the object for themself. Monetary transfers are unavailable. We consider mechanisms where it is a dominant strategy to report truthfully. On the negative side, deterministic mechanisms do not generally suffice, and anonymous mechanisms cannot elicit any information. On the positive side, there are simple mechanisms-jury mechanisms-that are optimal when there are three or fewer agents, approximately optimal in symmetric environments with many agents, and the only deterministic mechanisms satisfying a relaxed anonymity notion. In a jury mechanism, each agent is either a juror or a candidate. The jurors decide which candidate wins the object; jurors never win.

## Working papers

• Extended abstract accepted at EC’ 22.

• Abstract A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application of this setting is the efficient division of a fixed budget between two competing departments. We first characterize all implementable mechanisms under arbitrary correlation. Second, we study when there exists a mechanism that yields the principal a higher payoff than she could receive by choosing the ex-ante optimal decision without consulting the agents. In the budget example, such a profitable mechanism exists if and only if the information of one department is also relevant for the expected returns of the other department. We generalize this insight to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a profitable mechanism in the n-agent allocation problem with independent types.